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Hong Kong, as a special administrative region of China, has utilized the rail-
plus-property (R+P) model, as a special form of value capture strategy, to successfully 
finance its railway development and operation. Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway (MTR) 
Corporation becomes one of the very few profitable railway companies in the world. 
MTR has also been cooperating with the Shenzhen government to implement the R+P 
model in financing Shenzhen’s subway expansion. This is considered the first 
experimentation of R+P model in mainland China. The objective of this paper is to shed 
light on the prospect of using R+P model in China by conducing comparative case 
studies of Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The two case cities are selected to give a 
comparative picture of how R+P model works. The comparison will focus on how the 
model works in the two cities given different urban contexts and regulation frameworks. 
The paper will conclude with policy implications and recommendations for the 
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China has experienced rapid urbanization over the last several decades. Since 
marketization of the land market in the 1990s, there has been a trend of 
suburbanization in many Chinese cities with residents moving into the outskirts of 
cities and living in newly built residential apartments. This suburbanization trend has 
led to increased rate of urban sprawl and consequently increased demand for 
automobiles for commuting and access to various sources in the city center. Not 
surprisingly, the total number of automobiles has been rising at an astonishing speed 
and this has caused many problems to urban development, such as traffic congestion 
and air pollution. For example, Beijing, as the capital city of the country, is famous for 
its severe traffic congestion during peak hours even for its highways. And Harerbin, a 
northeastern city, suffered a smog crisis last year which shows the severity of the air 
quality challenges that China has been facing. 
As a response to resolving such challenges, China has been adopting 
nationwide transit-prioritized transportation policies to reduce current automobile 
usage and discouraging people who do not have a car from buying a car. Among 
many strategies initiated by the government, TOD becomes more and more popular. 
However, transit financing has been one of the biggest challenges that China is 
facing. China has experienced a fiscal decentralization process since 1978 and the 
current tax-sharing system between the central and local governments shifts the 
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funding responsibility to the local level. To obtain more revenue, local governments 
set up local government financing platforms (LGFPs) to help reduce financing 
pressure and land transfer fees have been a major source of revenue for urban 
transportation development. Nevertheless, such financing mechanism may not be 
sustainable and local governments are facing increasing pressure on transit 
financing.  
Hong Kong, as a special administrative region of China, has utilized rail-plus-
property (R+P) model, as a special form of value capture strategy, to successfully 
finance their railway development and operation. Hong Kong Mass Transit Railway 
(MTR) Corporation becomes one of very few railway companies that are profitable. In 
the recent years, MTR has been cooperating with the Shenzhen government to 
implement R+P model in financing the city’s subway expansion. This is considered 
the first experimentation of R+P model on transit financing in mainland China. 
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the prospect of using R+P model 
in China by conducing comparative case studies of Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The 
two case cities (one in mainland China and one as special administrative region in 
China) are selected to give a comparative picture of how R+P model works. The 
comparison will focus on how the model works in the two cities given different urban 
contexts and regulation frameworks. The paper will conclude with policy implications 
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and recommendations for the possibility and challenges of applying R+P model in 
other Chinese cities. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are four parts for this literature review. The first part will briefly discuss 
the public financing in China to lay out the contextual background. The second part 
will have an overview of the concept of value capture. Next, as TOD is considered to 
be closely related to value capture, the concept of TOD will be discussed briefly. The 
last section will touch on the interaction between PPPs and value capture, because 
the R+P model often involves both public and private participation or cooperation. 
2.1. Public Financing in China 
 
China’s fiscal context is much different than that of the Western countries 
partly because of its law on property ownership. For example, China does not have a 
property tax system similar to that of the United States. Man (2011) gave a brief 
overview of local public finance in China. The article discussed the country’s fiscal 
decentralization and local tax structure and argued that the sale of land development 




In addition, China has a unique land market that the local governments rely on 
to generate fiscal revenue. Xiao (2014) explained the operational details of land 
quota market in China and the strategies local governments use to generate more 
quota. Although the land quota system established by the central government can to 
some extent control local governments’ strong interests of land conversion, 
transportation financing in China would still mostly likely rely on land transfer sales. 
Furthermore, Tao et al. (2010) explored different land leasing strategies used by local 
governments and found out that more than 75% of the land was leased through 
closed-door negotiation with private developers and the rest through more 
transparent ways such as auction, bidding and listing.  
While the local governments in U.S. can have high borrowing capacity, the 
local governments in China are not allowed to borrow from the financial market by 
law and thus they have been relying on local government financial platforms (LGFPs) 
to finance their urban infrastructure development.  Lu et al. (2013) wrote a working 
paper on the origin and functions of LGFPs and potential risks of using such 
financing tools. They pointed out the severe revenue and expenditure mismatches at 
the local government level and using LGFPs is subject to the volatility of the real 




2.2. Value Capture in General 
 
While motor fuel tax has been one of the major revenue sources for 
transportation development, its financing capacity is weakening and the government 
may need to come up with alternative financing strategies. One of the popular ways 
is through value capture. Zhao et al. (2012) discussed a variety of value capture 
strategies, such as land value tax, tax increment financing and special assessments, 
and then evaluated them based on four criteria. The paper’s major conclusion is to 
encourage all levels of governments to take advantage of a bundle of value capture 
instruments as replacement revenue sources. 
According to Medda (2012), accessibility is an important factor in land value 
capture, because it can induce increases in land value and then some or all of these 
increases in land value due to increase in accessibility can be captured to recover the 
capital costs of a transport investment.  
Medda (2012) categories land value capture mechanisms into three broad 
categories – betterment tax, accessibility increment contribution and joint 
development. Betterment tax means levying a tax on land value added by public 
transport investment. Its targeted group is the group of people who benefit from a 
range of aspects such as reduced pollution and congestion through improved 
transportation system. The logic behind charging such tax is that the additional value 
generated by the transport investment should be shared among all citizens rather 
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than specific private individuals (Batt 2001). One of the examples is the business rate 
supplement charged across the greater London area.  
The second category is accessibility increment contribution (AIC) that refers to 
strategies that earmark future revenues to finance current transport expenditures. 
The government often uses various financial instruments to raise capital, such as 
general obligation bonds. One popular example of AIC is tax increment financing 
which is commonly used in urban redevelopment and transportation projects. 
However, it is important to note that it is not only necessary for such projects to 
generate revenue sufficient to cover costs, but also to be economically sustainable 
with positive net present value (Dye and Sundberg 1998).  
The third category is joint development which means residential and 
commercial property development close to transit stations, for the mutual benefits of 
both public and private interests. Such mechanisms are often used in the context of 
transit-oriented development which emphasizes the importance of using the land 
around transit stations for mixed-used and high-density development (Robert Cervero 
et al. 2004) 
In addition to the above classification approach, land value capture strategies 
can also be classified into just two categories – taxation based land capture 
strategies and development based value capture strategies (Olajide 2015). Taxation 
based land value capture strategies often impose taxes and fees on existing 
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developments in transit development areas, such as tax increment financing, special 
assessments, land value taxes, betterment charges, impact fees and station 
connection fees. Development value capture mechanism often needs the 
involvement of the government in development on land near transit stations. Some 
examples include land sales, air rights sale, land lease agreement and land 
adjustment. 
There are several key factors for effective implementation of land value 
capture strategies. First of all, it is essential to have an established property tax 
system to finance public transport through land value capture strategies. Developed 
countries like US and UK have mature property tax system and therefore it is 
administratively feasible and easy to implement many value capture mechanisms. 
However, it is also noteworthy that in such established system, it is relatively hard to 
create a new tax system to implement innovate financing strategies (Boyd 2011). In 
addition, while developed countries have mature property tax systems, many 
developing countries do not have such tax systems in place, and need to rely on 
other mechanisms to capture the additional land value created by transport 
investment (Salon and Shewmake 2011). One alternative is to lease or sell land near 
public transport or to grant development rights in areas served by public transport. 
One essential condition for this alternative is that the transit development company 
needs to have the capability to buy or lease land at very low cost. Another alternative 
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is to create a public-private partnership to finance transportation development. The 
challenge is to effectively negotiate with private companies and come up with plans 
to serve both the public and private interests (Salon and Shewmake 2011). 
Secondly, enabling compact development provides a favorable condition for 
land value capture, because the increased development density can facilitate 
transportation development and promote surrounding economic activities (Rybeck 
2004). With higher density of property within transit development zones, there would 
be higher population density within these areas. Having higher population density is a 
favorable condition to generate larger traffic flow, which in turn provides the traffic 
needs for the transport investment. At the same time, with a larger volume of traffic 
flows, there would be more customers for the businesses located near transit 
stations, promoting surrounding economic activities. One way of achieving this is 
through value capture in the form of split rate tax (Rybeck 2004). In particular, the tax 
rate on assessed building values would be higher than that on assessed land values, 
so that developers would build more on relatively more expensive land. 
Thirdly, in a larger view, it is important for the government to coordinate land 
using planning and economic development with public transit development (Salon 
and Shewmake 2011). When designing a transportation investment plan, the 
government may need to change existing zoning codes or come up with new zoning 
policies to support transit development. For example, in order to encourage compact 
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development, the government needs to allow high floor-area ratio in the transit 
development area, in addition to other tax policies such as split rate tax discussed 
earlier. Secondly, economic development should also be considered accordingly. The 
government may attract more businesses to the development zone by offering 
various tax incentives. With more economic activities around transportation facilities, 
the adjacent property value would increase substantially and thus allowing more 
value to be captured to pay for transport investment.  
In addition, as discussed earlier, land value capture strategy essentially replies 
on the increased property value generated by transport investment. Many literatures 
quantitatively examined the effects of public transit on property values. Some of the 
studies and their key findings are listed in the table below. In general, public 













1 km reduction in distance to train stations would lead to an  
increase in residential property value of at least 1.5% in price 
Bae et al (2003) Seoul 





Property within walking distance of certain stations has a 
price premium between 4.7% to 15.7% 
Wang (2010) Shanghai 
Compared to residential properties within 1 to 1.5 km of rapid 
transit line 8, the prices of residential properties within 0.5 km 
of stations increase by 7.2 percent due to the impact of rapid 
transit system stations. 
Zheng and Kahn 
(2008) 
Beijing 
An increase of 10% in distance from urban subways reduces 
housing prices by 0.8% to 1.6% 
 
Gibbons and Machin (2005) used a quasi-experimental method and estimated 
that a 1km reduction in distance to train stations in London would lead to an increase 
in surrounding residential property value of at least 1.5% in price. Wang (2010) 
studied Shanghai rapid transit line 8 using hedonic price models, and found out that 
compared to residential properties within 1 to 1.5 km of rapid transit stations, the 
prices of residential properties within 0.5 km of stations increase by 7.2 percent due 
to the impact of rapid transit system stations. Cervero and Murakami (2009) explored 
the case of Hong Kong and found out that property within walking distance of certain 
stations had a price premium between 4.7% to 15.7%. Zheng and Kahn (2008) found 
out that in Beijing, an increase of 10% in distance from urban subways reduces 
housing prices by 0.8% to 1.6%. In addition, Bae et al (2003) found that in Seoul, 
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additional 1km to subway line 5 leads to a 3% decrease in price. All these studies 
demonstrate that in general, transit development can increase the value of 
surrounding property value. 
2.3. Transit-Oriented Development and Value Capture 
 
While China has a highly transit-prioritized transportation policy and transit-
oriented development (TOD) becomes a popular concept and practice nationwide, 
the country is still in the process of learning how to successfully implement TOD 
taking into consideration of local contexts. Mu et al. (2012) summarized from 
literature the pre-conditions that a city needs to fulfill in order for effective TOD 
implementation and used a case study of a Chinese city, Dalian, to see the city’s 
status of satisfying the commonly identified conditions.  
As TOD and value capture is closely related, these conditions are also 
relevant when adopting R+P model in different cities. Xueming's (2010) study 
compared the general contextual differences between U.S. and China with respect to 
TOD design. Major differences lie in aspects such as population density, urban 
spatial structure and land use intensity. Cervero et al. (2009) used modeling to study 
the effects of TOD on ridership in Hong Kong’s R+P model and found that the 
combination of R+P model and appropriate TOD would increase weekly ridership by 
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about 35,000. This study sheds light on the possible positive interactions between 
TOD and use of value capture strategies.                  
2.4. Public-Private Partnership and Value Capture 
 
As value capture strategies, such as R+P model, often involves PPPs, it is 
also important to understand the interaction between PPPs and value capture 
strategies. In the context of China, the country has been exploring new financing 
mechanisms for urban transit development. Among others, PPPs becomes more and 
more popular. While the practice of PPP model is not very common and successful in 
U.S., it seems to work well in Asia and particularly in China (Phang 2007). De Jong et 
al. (2010) discussed the use of PPP model in the Chinese context by illustrating 
through seven Chinese case studies. Their research approach is to first discuss the 
pre-conditions that scholars believe countries need to satisfy for effective 
implementation of PPP and then evaluate whether China met these requirements.  
Chang (2013) also conducted a study on the feasibility of using PPP model in 
China, through a case study analysis on Beijing’s No.4 Metro Line. This study is from 
the perspectives of contract negotiation, revenue sharing and risk allocation and the 
main conclusion is that the public sector may save up to about one third of the initial 
investment through PPP model and the private partners may earn a profit with a high 
risk due to the immature legal system in China. From this research result, we can see 
that the PPP model may be a useful tool for the Chinese government to finance its 
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transportation investment. But when learning from the PPP practices from the U.S., 
we may need to take into account the current legal framework in China and be 
cautious about whether the interests of private investors can actually be supported 
and protected by law. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
This paper will use an approach of comparative case studies. The data 
gathered for this research comes from secondary sources which are publicly 
available, such as government policy documents, company’s publications, news 
articles as well as relevant existing literature and reports from research institutes.  
 Two case studies are chosen (i.e., Shenzhen Metro and Hong Kong MTR) to 
give a comparative picture of how R+P model works in different urban contexts and 
regulation frameworks. Hong Kong MTR’s practice of rail-plus-property model has 
been widely recognized as a highly successful financing mechanism for transit 
development. Almost every transit system in the world is in financial crisis with the 
exception of the Hong Kong railway system. Hong Kong’s special identity, a special 
administrative region of China, makes this case study particularly relevant to evaluate 
how the Hong Kong model can be modified and applied in other Chinese cities with 
different contexts and regulations. Shenzhen, a fast growing Chinses city, has been 
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cooperating with Hong Kong MTR to experiment R+P model in its Longhua Metro 
Line and it has been successful. Due to the different regulatory frameworks between 
Hong Kong and Shenzhen, the Hong Kong model needs to be modified. This case 
study will analyze the how the model is currently working in Shenzhen and what are 
the challenges forward.  
 
4. Comparative Analysis 
 
In this section, a comparative analysis of Shenzhen and Hong Kong on the 
implementation of the rail-plus-property model is conducted. First, I will give an 
overview of the public transit and the metro companies in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. 
Then I will discuss the urban contexts of both cities and operation performance of 
Hong Kong MTR and Shenzhen Metro. The core part of this section is the 
comparative analysis of funding and regulatory frameworks as well as the business 
models. 
4.1. Public Transit and Metro Companies in Hong Kong and Shenzhen 
 
Hong Kong is one of the world’s most densely populated cities with an area of 
1,104 km2 and more than seven million people. Its public transportation is provided 
by the Hong Kong MTR Corporation. It was established in 1975 to construct and 
operate a railway system to provide fast and reliable public transportation for the 
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people of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government was its sole shareholder until the 
year 2000—when the government sold 23% of issued shares to the private sector via 
initial public offering. In 2007, the MTR merged with Kowloon-Canton Railway 
Corporation to better serve the public transportation needs of Hong Kong citizens. 
The railway service provided by the MTR mainly covers the Hong Kong Island, 
Kowloon, and the New Territories1. As of 2014, the MTR has a total route length of 
220.9 km, 2,106 rail cars, and 87 metro stations, with 1,350 station shops. 
Shenzhen’s railway development and operation are mainly under the 
responsibility of Shenzhen Metro Group Company established in 1998. There are five 
subway lines that are currently in operation with a total route length of 178 km. The 
subway lines that are operated by Shenzhen Metro are lines 1,2,3, and 5, with the 
line 4 operated by MTR (Shenzhen) Corporation. There are 116 stations that are 
managed by Shenzhen Metro. It is projected that after the additional three lines 7, 9 
and 11 are in operation approximately by the end of 2016, the total route length will 





                                                          
1 Please refer to the appendix for the complete subway map of Hong Kong. 
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4.2. Urban Context 
 
As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong is one of the world’s most densely populated 
cities, with very limited urban land and more than seven million people. But what 
makes it such a dense city? One major factor is its geographic characteristics 
(Freemark 2010). The majority part of Hong Kong are mountains and parks and this 
landscape characteristic makes Hong Kong people live and work only in limited 
zones, thus making Hong Kong a very densely populated city around the world. For 
example, although New Territories share the largest piece of Hong Kong’s land, the 
residential and commercial areas are most concentrated in the southern part of the 
Kowloon Peninsula and northern part of Hong Kong Island.  
This is further backed by the population density data. The table below shows 
Hong Kong’s population density by three main areas – Hong Kong Island, Kowloon 
and New Territories. The land population density on average is 6,544 people/km2 and 
the differences between the three areas are significant. As we can see, Kowloon has 
the highest population density followed by Hong Kong Island and New Territories, 
and a further analysis based on densities of District Council Districts2 show that the 
four districts with the highest densities are all with in Kowloon. The larger upper areas 
                                                          
2 Please refer to the Appendix. 
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in the New Territories and the southern part of Hong Kong Island have relatively very 
low population densities.  
 
Because of high urban density, land value in Hong Kong is very high compared 
to many other Chinese cities. Every piece of land in Hong Kong is extremely 
valuable, especially the land near transit stations. Thus, there is sufficient property 
value for the MTR to capture to pay for its transit development. In addition, there is no 
suburb in this small island city, which makes the railway system highly accessible to 
the majority of people in Hong Kong. This in turn leads to high subway ridership. 
Consequently, the high ridership boosts the economic activities around the stations 
because it brings a large number of people in and out of stations, where many 
commercial businesses are located.  
2001 2006 2011
Hong Kong Island  16 775  15 915  15 924
Kowloon  43 201  43 033  44 917
New Territories  3 526  3 748  3 870
Land total  6 237  6 352  6 544
Year
Area
Hong Kong's Population Density*
Source: 2011 Hong Kong Population Census 




Shenzhen, in contrary, 
has a lower density than Hong 
Kong. According to the data from 
the Sixth National Population 
Census as shown in the table on 
the right, Shenzhen’s average 
population density is 5201 
people/km2. However, Hong 
Kong’s population density in 
2011, as mentioned earlier, was about 6544 people/km2, which is much higher than 
that of Shenzhen. It is noteworthy that, similar to Hong Kong, the population densities 
of different zones in Shenzhen vary significantly. While the average density is 5,201 
people/km2, the highest two are 16,756 people/km2 for Futian Zone and 11,726 
people/km2 for Loufu Zone. The four zones in the middle and Western part of the city, 
including Luofu Zone, Futian Zone, Nanshan Zone and Baoan Zone have the highest 








Luofu Zone 923423 11726
Futian Zone 1318055 16756
Nanshan Zone 1087936 5877
Baoan Zone 4017807 7059
Guangming Zone 481420 3097
Longgang Zone 2011225 2945
Pingshan New Zone 309211 1852
Yantian Zone 208861 2798
Population Density in Shenzhen, 2010
Source: 6th National Population Census




4.3. Operational Performance 
 
The MTR’s railway system currently has an average number of about 5.4 million 
weekday passengers. The average number of passengers has increased from about 
2.5 million in 2005 to more than 5 million in 2015. In fact, more than 90% of people in 
Hong Kong rely on public transportation for motorized trips. This increasing trend of 
subway ridership partly demonstrates the MTR’s success as an effective railway 
operator to provide convenient public transportation and reduce automobile 
dependence. The railway fares range from about HK$4.5 to 50.5, depending on 
distance traveled. The MTR system’s average fare has remained stable, around 
HK$8 from 2010 to 2014. This is very cheap compared to the standard single-trip 
subway fare of $2.75 in New York City and from £1.5 up to £6.9 in London. On a 
comparative scale, the fare change has been considerably lower than the Hong Kong 
payroll index but in line with the consumer price index.  
Shenzhen Metro’s fare charge is also distance-based, with a starting price of ¥2. 
For additional ¥1, a passenger can travel for another 4km, 6km or 8km based on 
different distance ranges as shown in the table below. This fare standard lowers the 
travelling cost for people with long travel distance. The average subway fare remains 
around ¥2.6 over the past few years and this is much cheaper to the average price of 
HK$8 of the Hong Kong MTR trips. However, Hong Kong MTR has an amazingly 
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high farebox recovery ratio of about 185%, defined as the ratio of fares over 
operating expenses. This ratio ranks among the world’s highest. 
                       
In terms of financial status, the Hong Kong MTR has better standing than 
Shenzhen Metro. MTR has a very strong cash position. Remarkably, receipts from 
operating activities ($HK15.4 billion) and property development (HK$9.2 billion) are 
the major cash contributors, with few government subsidies and no net borrowings in 
2014. More than half of the cash is used to finance capital expenditure and pay for 
interest and dividends. In addition, due to high profit-generating capability and low 
borrowing levels, the MTR’s net debt-to-equity ratio remains fairly low. The net debt-
to-equity ratio decreased from about 12% in 2013 to 7.6% in 2014. On the contrary, 
Shenzhen Metro has a debt to asset ratio of 54.9% which suggests that the company 
may rely too much on borrowing. 
From the operation’s perspective, the MRT achieves an incredibly high 
performance level on several aspects. In the first half of 2015, the train service 
Distance Range (km) Additional Distance (km) per ¥1
4 to 12 4
12 to 24 6
Over 24 8
Shenzhen Subway Fare for Single Trips
Source: Shenzhen Metro
Note: the starting fare for the first 4 km is ¥2.
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delivery rate, passenger journeys on-time rate, and train punctuality rate were all 
99.9%. In comparison, while there is lack of data showing the overall operation 
performance of Shenzhen railway services, the available data on Line 4 which is 
operated by MTR Corporation Shenzhen (MTRSZ) indicates that the operation 
performance of railway services on Line 4 is of very high standard. As we can see 
from the table below, the passenger-journeys on-time rate and train service delivery 
rate are both 100% and its train punctuality rate is 99.9%.  
               
4.4. Rail-Plus-Property Model 
After an overview of Hong Kong MTR and Shenzhen Metro’s operational 
performance, this section discusses the financing strategies for their transit 
development and operation. We will first evaluate the funding and regulatory 
framework of both cities’ rail-plus-property models and then discuss the details of the 




Passenger journeys on time 100%
Train punctuality 99.9%
Train service delivery 100%
Source: MTR Shenzhen
Operation Performance of Line 4 in Shenzhen, 2014
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4.4.1. Funding and Regulatory Framework 
 
Hong Kong 
According to the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, all 
land is owned by Government (except for the land on which St. John’s Cathedral 
Church stands). Land can be leased for different uses for a period of time at a 
premium with a set of lease conditions. After 1997, land is normally leased for a term 
of 50 years. So the government can lease the land in order to gain revenue.    
 
The diagram above shows the relationships among different parties in the rail-
plus-property model. As discussed earlier, the land value in Hong Kong is extremely 
high due to its limited space. The government lowers costs of obtaining land 
development rights for MTR. In fact, there is a special agreement between the MTR 
and the government. The government grants MTR the development rights at pre-rail 
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prices, and then MTR offers development opportunities to private developers at an 
after-rail price. The logic behind this approach is clear - after railways are developed, 
the price of land adjacent to the railway will skyrocket and so the difference between 
pre-rail and after-rail prices is substantial. The land premium would be returned to the 
government, which is a major shareholder of MTR. In essence, the government 
grants the MTR land development rights at a very low cost and the profit margin from 
this value capture mechanism would be high enough to cover major railway 
development costs. In addition, the local land use law also supports the property 
development around train stations. For example, to promote efficient land use and 
encourage dense urban development, a floor-area ratio of 10 is allowed in certain 
districts with a mix of residential and transportation facilities. 
 
The summary table above shows the detailed information about recent 
network extension projects in Hong Kong, including the type of funding used. As we 
can see, two out of five projects (i.e. South Island Line and Kwun Tong Line) are 
funded through the rail-plus-property mechanism, while the Island Line Extension is 
Line Completion (2014) No of Stations Route Length (Km) Type of Funding
Island Line Extension 100% 3 2.7 Capital Grant
South Island Line 82% 5 7 Rail plus Property
Kwun Tong Line 72% 2 2.6 Rail plus Property
Express Rail Link 66% 1 26 Service Concession
Shatin to Central Link 27% 10 17 Service Concession
Hong Kong Network Extention Projects in 2014
Source: Hong Kong MTR Annual Report 2014
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funded through capital grant and the rest two are funded through service 
concessions which are essentially public-private partnerships. 
Shenzhen 
The land ownership policy in mainland China is similar to that of Hong Kong 
but with some differences. While the sole owner of land in Hong Kong is the 
government, owners of land in mainland China are either the state or rural 
collectives. However, during urban sprawl, the local governments can take the rural 
land and transform it into urban land by compensating rural collectives. Urban land, 
although publicly owned, can be leased to private entities for development through 
auction, bidding and listing. The length of land lease period depends on development 
purposes. In particular, land can be leased to private entities for residential, industrial 
and commercial development for 70, 50, and 40 years respectively.  
In addition, there are two major differences between Shenzhen and Hong 
Kong regarding the land regulation policies. First, as Hong Kong has been running 
with its land leasing policy for a long time and its lease term is with easy renewal, 
land owners can almost treat leased land as private property, even though they only 
have land use rights. Therefore, they have a very secure expectation on what the 
land can be used for and investors have strong confidence in their investment and 
expectation on long term profits. However, in mainland China, the land market has 
only existed for about 20 years and so investors would have much less confidence 
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due to the much less mature land leasing system. Secondly, While the Hong Kong 
government can directly grant land development rights at pre-rail price to MTR, the 
mainland Chinese land regulation law requires that the land lease process has to go 
through a bidding process. Consequently, in such process, the Shenzhen Metro may 
not get the land at all or at a desirable price. Therefore, it is important to recognize 
that these differences between the two land leasing systems pose challenges when 
applying the R+P model in mainland China.            
      
The development path of the Shenzhen subway lines has three major phases, 
as summarized in the table above. The first phase is for construction of Line 4 (4 km) 
and the first stage of Line 1 (17.4 km). The total construction costs are about 10.7 
billion (CNY). The second phase involves extension of Line 1 (23.4 km), Line 2 (35.8 
km), Line 3 (41.7 km) and Line 5 (40 km), with total costs of about 68.8 billion (CNY). 







Phase III No. 6,7,8,9,11 NA 81.2*
10.7
68.8
Shenzhen Metro Projects and Costs
Source: Shenzhen Metro
* The total cost of ¥81.2 billion is only for the lines 7, 9, and 11 which are currently 
under construction.





The third phase, which is the most current phase, is for 5 lines, namely Line 6, 7, 8, 8 
and 11 and the total costs are approximately 81.2 billion (CNY).  
As we can see, the construction costs are enormous especially for the second 
and third stage of subway development. How does Shenzhen Metro pay for such 
huge amount of costs? Shenzhen Metro takes different approaches to finance the 
construction for different phases and so it has been an evolving process as 
Shenzhen Metro accumulates more experience especially when learning from the 
Hong Kong MTR.  
The table below shows the financing strategies that Shenzhen Metro used to 
finance three phases of subway development. During the first phase, the funding 
mainly comes from government funding (70%) and bank loan (30%). The banks 
loans are obtained from a group of banks with an interest rate 10% lower than the 
market benchmark interest loan rate. At this stage, Shenzhen Metro had not yet 
started to implement the concept of rail-plus-property model from Hong Kong MTR. 
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Only from the second phase onwards, rail-plus-property model started to take 
shape in Shenzhen. The government funding support percentage decreased from 
70% to 50%. In addition, this 50% government support does not mainly come from 
the government revenue, but takes the form of granting land development rights at 
low costs to Shenzhen Metro. It is clear that in such way, Shenzhen started to imitate 
Hong Kong MTR’s practice. However, as discussed earlier, there is one major legal 
challenge in this adaptation process – the mainland Chinese leasing law requires a 
bidding process before the Shenzhen government can lease land to private entities. 
Under such legal restriction, Shenzhen Metro may end up not winning the bid or 
encounter huge costs to obtain the lease land.  
To overcome such challenge, Shenzhen government creates and attaches 
special conditions for potential bidders. In this way, it maximizes the chances for 
Shenzhen Metro to eventually win the bid at a low price. But Shenzhen Metro still 
Governemnt Support Others








(Direct Transfer of Land Development Rights)
Government Funding (50%)
(Land Development Rights through Bidding &
Direct Transfer of Land Development Rights)
Phasse II
Funding Structure




need to pay the upfront land leasing fees to the government. Then the government 
would later return this leasing payment to Shenzhen Metro and this would be the 
government funding for subway development. 
However, such funding process is not efficient enough and therefore at the 
later stage of the second phase, Shenzhen government starts to finance the subway 
construction by directly transferring the land development rights to Shenzhen Metro 
as a form of investment, in order to smoothen the funding process. There are at least 
two major advantages of this approach. First, it greatly reduces the financial burden 
of Shenzhen Metro because there is no need to pay for the upfront land leasing fees. 
Secondly, by removing the bidding process, it allows Shenzhen Metro to get the land 
development rights at low costs without any uncertainty. This improved financing 
strategy is used for all subway-related projects during the second phase, except for 
some projects, as such Qianhai and Shexikou.  
In addition to the changes on the aspect of government funding, it is 
noteworthy that Shenzhen Metro also cooperates with Hong Kong MTR to invest in 
the construction of Metro Line 4 Phase II, under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
agreement with the Shenzhen municipal government. This strategic arrangement 
allows experimentation of the rail-plus-property model under the guidance of the 
Hong Kong MTR.  
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In the third phase of the subway construction, the Shenzhen government fully 
applies the method of using land development rights as direct investment to support 
Shenzhen Metro while the total equivalent percentage of government funding is still 
capped at 50%. When there is still lack of funding after using this approach, the 
government injects its own municipal funding into the projects.  
In addition, there are two other major improvements on the funding 
mechanism. First, all the lines that are currently under construction (i.e. lines 7, 9, 11) 
are under build-transfer (BT) agreement which involves large central government 
companies. These companies set up local project companies in Shenzhen and are 
responsible for additional fund raising and construction of the subway lines. The 
major advantage of such approach is to take advantage of the technical and 
management skills of these large central government companies. The total funds 
raised by these companies are about 49.5 billion (RMB). In order to lessen the 
financial pressures of Shenzhen Metro, there is an agreement that the repayment of 
funds to these central-government companies can be in installments. In fact, by the 
end of 2015, Shenzhen Metro has successfully paid back about 31.1 billion (RBM) to 





4.4.2. Business Model 
 
Hong Kong’s Business Model 
The MTR’s financing model is essentially R+P development, which aims to 
capture the land and property value around subway stations. According to the MTR’s 
2014 annual report, value capture essentially consists of three major parts: station 
commercial businesses, property development, and property rental and management 
businesses. In addition to the profits from transport operations (HK$7 billion), the 
major profit contributors are station commercial businesses (HK$4.5 billion), property 
development (HK$4.2 billion), and property rental and management businesses 
(HK$3.4 billion). The overall operating margin before depreciation, amortization, and 
variable annual payment reaches its highest point of 38.4% in 2014. 
For station commercial businesses, the total revenue, operating costs, profits, 
and margin are presented in the table below. The operating margin of 89.6% is very 
high and makes station commercial businesses a crucial part of the value capture 
model. 
                             
   Total Revenue
   Operating Costs
   Operating Profits
   Operating Margin
Station Commercial Businesses
89.60%






The station commercial businesses include retail, advertising, telecommunication 
services, and others. The station retail businesses generate the highest revenues, 
followed by advertising and telecommunication services. For all four types, the 
revenues have been steadily increasing from 2010 to 2014, which demonstrates a 
healthy revenue-generating capacity. 
The second major contributor is property development. The MTR offers tenders 
to private companies to develop a wide range of property. There are many 
residential, retail, and other property development activities around large subway 
stations such as the LOHAS Park and Austin stations. The total profit from property 
development was HK$4,216 million in 2014. 
Property rental and management businesses are the MTR’s third major profit 
contributor. The total revenue, operating costs, profits, and margins are presented in 
the table below. The performance is similar to that of the station commercial 
businesses. Both sectors have operating profits much higher than costs, yielding a 
high margin of nearly 90%. 
              
   Total Revenue
   Operating Costs
   Operating Profits




    Property Rental and Management
88.20%
Source: Hong Kong MTR Annual Report 2014
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The value of the MTR’s investment properties has increased from around HK$45 
billion to HK$64 billion in 2014, and the net rental revenue also increased from 
HK$2,018 million to HK$3,222 million in 2014. The property under the MTR’s 
management covers a wide range of types, including residential, office, retail 
buildings, and car parks. 
 
Shenzhen’s Business Model 
In the case of Shenzhen, Metro Group Property Development Branch was 
established in 2007 with a dedicated role to develop property along subway lines. It 
has developed a successful business line which includes land reserve, bidding, 
design, construction as well as marketing. The businesses mainly include 
construction of affordable housing, commercial housing and other buildings such as 
hotels. For affordable housing construction, the property development branch started 
to deliver by installments 22,000 affordable housing units under several projects such 
as Tanglang and Shekou from the end of 2013 onwards. Commercial housing 
projects are along many railway lines such as lines 1, 2, 3, 5, which are under railway 
Phase II construction and lines 7, 9, 11, which are under railway Phase III 
construction. Examples of other types of projects include the Metro Scientific and 
Technological Building which is a mixed-use project that has a five-star hotel. 
36 
 
In addition to property development, Shenzhen Metro is also active in property 
management which is under the responsibility of Shenzhen Metro Property 
Management Development Company founded in 2006 as a subsidiary of Shenzhen 
Metro Group. Its businesses include property management of affordable and 
commercial housing, office buildings, large transit hubs, rolling stock depots, railway 
stations, as well as providing consulting services. The Property Development 
Company has grown fast since its inception. Its operating revenue increased 
significantly from about 7 million in 2006 to about 200 million in 2012, and its total 
property management areas increased dramatically from 330,000 m2 to about 
5,730,000 m2. 
The third business category is station commercial businesses which are under 
the responsibility of Resources Development Branch of Shenzhen Metro Group. It 
rents commercial space both on the ground and underground, offers advertising 
opportunities to companies, and provide telecommunication services. One famous 
example of the station commercial business is the Link City project which is an 
underground commercial district connecting the Shopping Park station and 
Convention & Exhibition Center station. Along this district locates commercial shops 
providing a variety of products including clothes, electronics, coffee and food. Link 
City becomes an essential part of the larger Futian central business district and is 
one of the country’s most successful underground business districts. 
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 In addition, the advertising businesses are conducted to cover both ground and 
underground space, through many channels like news magazines, station 
advertising, car handle advertising as well as outdoor advertising. Furthermore, for 
the communication services, Shenzhen is the first city in the country to have full 
coverage of Wifi connection in all Shenzhen stations and trains, and data services 
are also provided for residential and office buildings and hotels around the subway 
stations.  
 
Business Model Comparison 
After introducing the business models of Hong Kong MTR and Shenzhen Metro, 
let’s take a further look at the similarities and differences between their business 
portfolios. For an easy comparison, businesses are divided into five major categories, 
namely station commercial business, property development, property rental, property 




For station commercial businesses, both Hong Kong and Shenzhen are active in 
providing retail, advertising and telecommunication services. For property 
development, while both develop commercial housing, office buildings and hotels, 
Hong Kong is less active in affordable housing construction. As mentioned earlier, it 
is quite remarkable that the property development branch of Shenzhen Metro started 
to deliver by installments 22,000 affordable housing units under several projects such 
as Tanglang and Shekou. This raises the concern of the Hong Kong public on how 
the Rail-plus-Property model can really benefit the low income population and some 
worry that it may even make the situation worse (Suzuki et al. 2015). As a matter of 
fact, Hong Kong has a dedicated agency, Housing Authority, which has the 




Affordable Housing × √
Commercial Housing √ √
Office Buidlings √ √
Hotels √ √
Property Rental Retail (Shopping Malls) √ √
Affordable Housing × √
Commercial Housing √ √












responsibility of providing affordable housing. Consequently, the difference in the 
property management business lies also in the affordable housing. In addition, as for 
the property rental business, both Hong Kong and Shenzhen focus on retail space 
rental in large shopping malls.  
Another major difference is the geographic scope on provision of their consulting 
services. As we know, Hong Kong MTR serves as a global example on its operation 
and management of its public transit, thus MTR has the capability of providing 
consulting services as well as doing investment for not only cities in mainland China 
but also in many other countries. This not only provides Hong Kong MTR with the 
opportunities to gain more revenues from a variety of channels, but also gives it the 
chances to accumulate more operation and management skills, through these global 
experiences.  
The table below presents Hong Kong MTR’s major global business presence. 
Beyond China, MTR’s businesses are extended to many big cities around the world, 
such as London, Stockholm, Melbourne and Sydney. For example, in London, MTR 
formed a joint venture in 2007 with Arriva to provide rail services for London 
Overground under an operations and maintenance agreement, and more recently, 
under another operations and maintenance agreement in 2014, to provide railway 
services for the London Crossrail starting from May 2015.  
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As we can also see from this table, in Mainland China, MTR has investments in 
Beijing, Shenzhen and Hangzhou. In Beijing, Hong Kong MTR has a joint venture 
with Beijing Capital Group and Beijing Infrastructure Investment company. Under a 
public-private partnership agreement, the joint company, Beijing MTR Corporation is 
responsible for investing and operating Metro Lines 4 and 14. It also provides 
through-train services which connect Metro Line 4 and the Daxing Line under an 
operations and maintenance agreement. In Shenzhen, under build-operate-transfer 
agreement, MTR Corporation (Shenzhen) Limited was established in 2004 with 
responsibilities of Longhua Line Phase II construction as well as operation of the 
entire Longhua line for 30 years. In addition, In Hangzhou, MTR also formed a joint 
Area City Year Types Activities
PPP Metro Lines 4 &14
O&M Daxing Line 
Shenzhen 2004 BOT Longhua Line
Hangzhou 2012 PPP Metro Lines 1
2007 O&M London Overground
2014 O&M Crossrail
2008 O&M Stockholm Metro
2008 NA MTR Stockholm
2013 NA Intercity Express
Melbourne 2009 O&M Melbourne Metro
PPP Procurement
O&M North West Rail Link
Source: Hong Kong MTR










venture with Hangzhou Metro Group in 2012 under a public-private partnership 
agreement for construction and operation of Metro Line 1.  
On the contrary, while Shenzhen Metro has some consulting business in other 
Chinese cities, it does not have any international business. It only provides consulting 
services to about four other Chinese cities – Nanning in Guangxi Province, Shangrao 
in Jiangxi Province, Neijiang in Sichuan Province and Fuoshan in Guangdong 
Province. In all the four cities, Shenzhen Metro acts as a corporate consultant to give 
advice on operation and management of large transit hubs, including Nanning 
Eastern Transit Hub, Shangrao Transit Hub, Neijiang Transit Hub as well as Fuoshan 
Transit Hub. For instance, in the case of Nanning Eastern Transit Hub, the Property 
Management Branch of Shenzhen Metro provided consulting services to Nanning 









5. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
After the comprehensive comparison of the rail-plus-property model 
applications between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, this section presents main 
conclusions and policy implications. 
5.1. Performance of Shenzhen Metro and Hong Kong MTR 
 
The rail-plus-property model works effectively in Hong Kong, and Shenzhen 
has made significant progress and success in adapting the Hong Kong model into 
local application through three different phases. In particular, we see that the 
Shenzhen municipal government started to grant land development rights to 
Shenzhen Metro through the official bidding process and then slowly moved into the 
approach of using land development rights as direct government investment into 
Shenzhen Metro.  
In addition, from the perspective of the business model, both Shenzhen Metro 
and Hong Kong MTR have diversified portfolios not only in the real estate 
development but also in other areas. Both portfolios generally cover property 
development, rental and management as well as providing consulting services. The 
two major differences are that Shenzhen Metro seems to have been more active in 
the affordable housing market than Hong Kong MTR, and Hong Kong MTR’s 
business has an international presence in many other countries such as Australia 
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and the United Kingdom, while Shenzhen Metro’s business is only limited to 
mainland China. 
5.2. Challenges Faced by Shenzhen Metro 
 
Shenzhen Metro encounters many challenges when learning from Hong Kong 
MTR’s practice. Hong Kong’s high urban density, which is a result of its highly limited 
urban space and concentrated urban population living and working zones, forms a 
virtually perfect environment for implementing the rail-plus-property model by creating 
considerable potential land premium to capture through the model. On the contrary, 
while Shenzhen’s urban density is high in the middle and western part of the city, it 
has a lower density in the eastern area and this would largely limit the potential 
implementation of the rail-plus-property model on a city-wide scale. 
 In addition, as discussed, the differences in regulatory framework between 
Shenzhen and Hong Kong pose challenges as well especially in terms of land 
leasing policies and general property rights. However, as Shenzhen’s is one of the 
nation’s most innovative cities, it has the privilege with the support from the central 






5.3. Key Conditions for Implementation of Rail-Plus-Property Model 
 
Based on the Hong Kong MTR and Shenzhen Metro’s practice, we can 
summarize some key conditions on successful application of the rail-plus-property 
model, and these are essential conditions for China to apply such model in other 
mainland cities.  
First of all, a city’s urban context is the first thing to check. The urban density 
of the whole city or certain targeted areas should be high enough so that there is 
enough future value to capture in order to cover the subway development costs. On 
top of it, a transit-oriented development approach would greatly increase the value to 
be captured because when railway ridership increases the land and property around 
the railway lines would increase.  
Secondly, the regulatory framework needs to be reformed to support the 
implementation of the rail-plus-property model. Ideally, it should smoothen the 
transfer process of land development rights, lower any transaction costs within such 
process and more importantly have a comprehensive legal framework to protect the 
rights and interests of private partnership companies so that they have more 
incentives to invest in subway development and operation.  
Last but not least, through the comparative analysis of the business models of 
both Shenzhen and Hong Kong MTR, we can see that it is essential to have a 
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structural and diversified business portfolio to generate enough profits to pay for 
railway development.  
5.4. Critical Review of Rail-Plus-Property Model 
 
While the R +P model has many advantages, it is essential for the government 
to understand its disadvantages as well. This section will briefly summarize the 
model’s main advantages and then discuss in details its major disadvantages, as 
shown in the table below.       
          
The R+P model mainly has four advantages. First, it provides significant 
funding for railway development and operation. As discussed earlier, there are huge 
profits realized from the real estate sector and other businesses. Second, the model 
takes advantage of the large land premium to partly subsidize railway construction. 
Third, there is potential profitability. However, making a transportation system 
profitable may not necessarily be good and this will be discussed in details in the 
following paragraph on disadvantages of the model. Last but not least, by using this 
Advantages Disadvantages
Provision of Significant Funding
Utilization of Land Premium
Potential Profitability
Management Expertise
Many Conditions on Implementation
Equity Issues
Opportunity Costs
Investment Risk in Real Estate
 R+P Model: Major Advantages & Disadvantages
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model, it is more likely to bring in management expertise suitable for construction, 
operation and maintenance due to its profit-driven nature.  
However, the R+P model has several major disadvantages that the 
government needs to be aware of. First, there are many conditions for this model to 
work and some key conditions have been discussed in details in the previous section. 
The point is that not all cities can use this model to finance its public transit and it is 
important for the government to pre-check the conditions of a specific city before 
applying the model.  
Second, there are equity issues involved. Although the model is profitable, but 
it is not necessarily good. As discussed earlier, one condition for this model to work is 
to have high population density. But this selection criterion will leave out the people in 
the suburbs with low density. Then the government needs to provide subsidies on 
transportation in suburbs to serve these people. It is crucial to understand that transit 
development has public externality. Due to its public nature, financial sustainability 
does not mean that it has to be profitable and providing subsidies does not mean that 
it is not financially sustainable. So it is not necessary that all transit development 
should be fully covered by user fees or through a business portfolio as we see in the 
cases of both Hong Kong and Shenzhen. Furthermore, the goal of providing access 
to the people in as many areas as possible is much more important than making 
profits itself. Therefore, the government should really understand the importance of 
47 
 
building citywide access rather than put efforts into making a transportation system 
profitable. And even if it is profitable, the government should think about the use of 
the profits in areas beyond transportation development such construction of 
affordable housing. 
Third, there is an opportunity cost when the government provides land 
development rights at low cost to the MTR rather than to developers directly. This is 
the opportunity cost to the government, because the cost reduction provided to the 
MTR could have been used for other public purposes. It is important to emphasize 
here that the government is responsible for providing a wide range of public services 
beyond public transportation. The government could use the revenue from sale of 
land development rights to subsidize some social welfare programs such as providing 
affordable housing or subsidizing education. Therefore, by offering land development 
rights to the MTR deprives the government of the flexibility on budget usage, and this 
would also give the MTR the opportunity to make decent profits to please its 
shareholders rather than the general public. 
Lastly, there is also investment risk involved in the real estate business. The 
unpredictable pattern of the real estate market will pose significant risks when 
applying the R+P model. If the real estate market is healthy, the model may work 






Last but not least, based on the conclusions above, I would like to make some 
recommendations on implementing the rail-plus-property model in mainland Chinese 
cities.  
First, when promoting the rail-plus-property model, it might be good to start on 
a small scale and then expand if desirable. This strategy applies to two situations. If a 
city is not sure whether this model would work, it is good to start off with a specific 
subway line or even just a portion of a line to allow a try-and-error process. Another 
situation is that urban density and transit ridership are only high at a certain part of 
the city. In this case, it is reasonable that the rail-plus-property model works only for 
limited areas because it is not necessary and often hard to meet all conditions to 
implement it city-wide.  
Secondly, the government should lessen its involvement in some aspects of 
the model implementation such as the operation and management of subway lines. 
This is because what lies in the core of the success story of Hong Kong MTR is the 
profit-driven mindset which is normally a characteristic of a private company. In 
essence, the philosophy of the rail-plus-property model relies on the capability of 
generating revenue from a thoughtfully-designed business portfolio which mainly 
relies on the real estate sector. Having less government intervention and injecting 
more private blood would help implement the model.  
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Adding on to the second suggestion, the metro company responsible for 
subway development and operation should keep the public especially investors well-
informed. This covers many aspects such as constantly publishing reports on key 
operational performance and financial information. Shenzhen Metro’s published 
reports are much less transparent and provide much less information than those of 
Hong Kong MTR. Timely publication of such information is crucially important not 
only because private investors need it but also because it can be served as a data 
base for other cities to research on and create potential partnerships. 
5.6. Prospect of Using Rail-Plus-Property Model in Other Chinese Cities 
 
Some other mainland Chinese cities, such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou, do have the potential to adopt the rail-plus-property model by learning 
from the experiences of both Hong Kong and Shenzhen.  
First of all, the urban densities of these large mainland Chinese cities are high 
enough to create considerable value to be captured. And the public transit systems of 
Beijing and Shanghai are very extensive and this forms the bases to take advantage 
of transit-oriented development approach to further increase the potential value to be 
captured by generating huge amount of public transit riders.  
Secondly, Shenzhen’s success story so far sets an extremely useful example 
for the other mainland Chinese cities especially in terms of legal framework. As 
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Shenzhen’s success continues to grow, the central government can further create 
regulations and laws based on Shenzhen’s practice in order to support other cities to 
apply the rail-plus-property model. Shenzhen Metro can provide consulting services 
to the cities that are new to the model and even to follow Hong Kong MTR to form 
joint venture partnerships with other cities’ local governments and metro companies 
to promote the rail-plus-property model.  
Finally, in terms of portfolio building and management, both Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen can provide valuable guidance to other cities on how to build a structural 
and diversified business portfolio to generate profits to pay for subway development.  
5.7. Overall Concluding Remarks 
 
As the financial pressure for China’s local governments is increasing, 
traditional financial mechanisms, like land transfer and local government financial 
platforms, seem to have limited capacity to provide sufficient funds to pay for urban 
transportation development. The rail-plus-property model, one type of land value 
capture finance, becomes an alternative financing strategy. By a comparative study 
approach, this thesis has evaluated the implementation of such model in both Hong 
Kong and Shenzhen, in addition to an analysis of the both cities’ urban context and 
the operational performance of the two cities’ metro companies.  
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This paper has also summarized the main challenges faced by Shenzhen 
Metro when imitating Hong Kong MTR’ practice, and the key conditions on effective 
implementation of the rail-plus-property model in other mainland Chinese cities. 
Based on this study, rail-plus property model has a great potential to help many more 
Chinese cities to finance its railway development and operation. However, the 
government needs to be aware of the model’s major disadvantages including equity 
problems. In light of all the challenges and issues discussed and depending on the 
urban context and development strategies of different cities, extensive application of 
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